Universitat Rovira i Virgili

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Research staff

Llerena Garrés, Francesc

Associate Professor

Despatx: D109
Group: grode
Pho.: 977759835
Email: francesc.llerena(ELIMINAR)@urv.cat

Specialties
  • Game theory
  • Assignment markets
Profile

Francesc Llerena is professor at the University Rovira i Virgili (URV). He obtained his bachelor degree in Economics Sciences from the Universitat of Barcelona and PhD by the University Rovira i Virgili. With regard to research, their fields of interest to focus on Game Theory and assignment of these markets.

Publications
Articles in journals JCR
  • Calleja, P.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc (2024): "Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: An axiomatic approach", Journal of Mathematical Economics ,111, 102955
  • Calleja, P.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Sudhölter, P. (2023): "Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split", Mathematical Social Sciences ,doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004,
  • Calleja, P.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc (2022): "Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems", Economics Letters ,221, 110921
  • Calleja, P.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Sudhölter, P. (2021): "Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games", Journal of Mathematical Economics ,102477,
  • Calleja, P.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Sudhölter, P. (2021): "Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems", Mathematical Social Sciences ,109, 45-51
  • Calleja, P.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc (2020): "Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value", Mathematical Social Sciences ,105, 28-33
  • Calleja, P.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Sudhölter, P. (2020): "Monotonicity and weighted prenucleoli: A characterization without consistency", Mathematics of Operations Research ,45, Issue 3, 1056-1068
  • Calleja, P.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc (2019): "Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions", International Journal of Game Theory ,48, 287-310
  • Calleja, Pedro; Llerena Garrés, Francesc (2017): "Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results", Social Choice and Welfare ,48, 197-220
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; llucia.mauri (2017): "On the existence of the Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution", Mathematical Social Sciences ,18, 92-99
  • Atay, Ata.; Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Núñez, Marina (2016): "Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices", TOP ,24 (3), 572-593
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; llucia.mauri (2016): "Reduced games and egalitarian solutions", International Journal of Game Theory ,45 (4), 1053-1069
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Núñez, Marina; Rafels, Carles (2015): "An axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment markets", International Journal of Game Theory ,44, 1-15
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Vilella Bach, Cori (2015): "The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core.", Mathematical Methods of Operations Research ,81, 235-244
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Rafels, Carles (2013): “Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games”, TOP ,21, 313-322
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc (2012): "The pairwise egalitarian solution for the assignment game", Operations Research Letters ,Vol. 40, 2, pp. 84-88
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc (2007): “An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation”, Economics Letters ,95, 80-84
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Rafels, C. (2007): “Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core”, International Journal of Game Theory ,35, 603-615
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Rafels, C (2006): “The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games”, Games and Economic Behavior ,54, 373-379
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Izquierdo, J.M.; Rafels, C. (2005): "Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games", Mathematical Social Sciences ,50 (3), 318- 330
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc (2000): "Una nota sobre valoración de opciones americanas y arbitraje", Investigaciones Económicas ,24 (1), 207-218
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Leguey, S. (1998): “Valoración de opciones de compra bermuda con precios de ejercicio variable”, Revista Española de Economía ,15,2, 199-216
Articles in journals not indexed in the JCR
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; llucia.mauri (2015): "On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set", Economics Bulletin ,4, 2475-2481
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Vilella Bach, Cori (2013): "An axiomatic characterization of the strtong constrained egalitarian solution", Economics Bulletin ,2, 1457-1456
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Nuñez,M (2011): “A geometric characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game”, Economics Bulletin ,Vol. 31 No. 4, pp. 3275-3285
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc (1996): “Acotaciones a la diferencia entre el valor de las opciones de compra y venta americanas”, Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economia de la Empresa ,2,1, 85-96
Books
Projects
Competitive calls

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